Rulers and Rascals:The Politics of Gold Mining in Mongolian Qing History by High, Mette & Schlesinger, Jonathan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rulers and Rascals
Citation for published version:
High, M & Schlesinger, J 2010, 'Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold Mining in Mongolian Qing History'
Central Asian Survey, vol 29, no. 3, pp. 289-304. DOI: 10.1080/02634937.2010.518008
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/02634937.2010.518008
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Central Asian Survey
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the Central Asian Survey 2010 Copyright
Taylor & Francis, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/02634937.2010.518008
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
Pre-copyedited version! Final version published in Central Asian Survey 29(3): 289-304. 
 1 
Rulers and Rascals: The Politics of Gold in Qing Mongolian History 
 
High, M.M.
a1
 and Schlesinger, J.
b
 
a
 Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics, London, UK. 
b
 History and East Asian Languages, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA.  
 
Abstract: This article examines the politics of gold mining in the Mongolian cultural 
region during the Qing period and today. By drawing on archival material and accounts 
by travellers of the period, we situate the current mining boom within its greater 
historical context. Since the exploration of gold has been surrounded by enduring 
notions of exclusivity and purity, the article shows how the mining for gold has 
historically been closely related to Mongolian practices of political rulership. By 
examining the current mining boom in Mongolia from a broader historical perspective, 
the article argues that this extractive economy involves much more than a search for 
profit. 
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Over the last decade Mongolia has become an attractive epicentre for prospectors and miners who seek 
plentiful and profitable mineral wealth. Fuelled by a free-market economy, large mineral discoveries 
and the fast growing realization that Mongolia can become a prime supplier of raw materials to China’s 
thriving economy, a mining boom has materialized and brought luring promises of prosperity to 
investors and the Mongolian nation. Whilst Robert Friedland, the chairman of one of the world’s 
largest copper and gold mines, Oyu Tolgoi, entices investors with his proclamation that mining in 
Mongolia is like making “T-shirts for five bucks and selling them for $100” (Wall Street Journal 2007), 
the country awaits a forecasted 38 percent increase in the annual GDP derived from mining 
developments alone (World Growth Mongolia 2009:3). With more than 30 percent of the country 
licensed for mining purposes, mining is today the largest and fastest growing economic sector in 
Mongolia. Alongside formal sector mining, a large-scale informal gold rush has also emerged (High 
2008). Attracting men and women, young and old, the gold rush involves more than 100,000 people 
and has spread throughout the country (ILO 2004:1). Whether formal or informal sector mining, the 
exploration of Mongolia’s mineral wealth is growing and economic predictions continue to sustain a 
strong sense of anticipation. 
 
Whilst the mining boom engenders future-oriented hopes and fears, it also serves as a reminder of the 
not-so-distant past. Only 20 years ago Mongolia was administered by a Soviet-socialist regime, had a 
centrally planned economy and a mining sector of minimal proportion
2
. To some, the growing mining 
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sector of today evidences Mongolia’s move away from a gloomy, stagnant and introverted past. To 
others, it highlights the problematic negotiation of interests in a society that no longer prioritizes social 
equality and security. In a country where nomadic pastoralism has historically been the largest 
economic sector (Humphrey and Sneath 1999), the current mining boom invites retrospective 
contemplation. Highlighting the connections and fractures between visions for the future and memories 
of the past, the growing mining industry has become a key marker of societal transformation. More 
than any other economic activity, today’s mining has become emblematic of a ‘changing Mongolia’, a 
‘new Mongolia’. 
 
This transformation is felt and expressed particularly in people’s relation to the land. As an industry of 
extraction, the mining boom has not only generated profit from the land, but also destabilized its 
broader position within local cosmology. In Mongolia the land is not merely a national territory, a 
physical backdrop for human activity, or an enabling ecology. It is also a dynamic constituent in what 
makes people human. Recognizing the physical environment (baigal) as having life, feelings and 
agency, elaborate taboos inform people’s engagement with the land. However, if such taboos are not 
adhered to, “if one part of nature denies the existence of another then eventually it will be denying its 
own” (Tseren 1996:147). As thousands of gold miners and mining companies currently uncover the 
land for its riches, the project of prosperity is seen to entail high stakes and is surrounded by much 
uncertainty. 
 
Anxieties about the future, challenges to people’s relationship with the land, and the experience of 
profound transformation are not unique to the present. Based on archival material of the Qing Empire 
(1644-1911), unique for its volume and variety of written records, and accounts by travellers of the 
period, we examine the historical politics of gold mining in the Mongolian cultural region
3
. Since the 
issues associated with mining today arose for the first time during the Qing period, this historical 
moment is particularly apt for examining Mongolian ideas about gold mining and societal 
transformations more generally. Both then and today, the hype of foreign prospectors, controversial 
mining concessions and the establishment of illegal mining camps have contributed to unsettling 
feelings about mining as cataclysmic for Mongolian ways of life. Alongside the production of 
substantial profit, gold mining has given rise to concerns about the exclusivity and purity of the land. 
Central to ‘gold diplomacy’ and trans-regional political relations, the mining of gold encapsulates the 
dynamic between Mongolian practices of rulership and local fears of incoming miners’ intrusive 
behaviour. By drawing on the history of Qing Mongolia and situating current events within their 
greater historical context, we suggest a move away from presentist analyses that simplify and 
essentialise notions of ‘transition’ and ‘modernity’ – discourses that are also strong among the 
Mongolian public. Rather than merely confirming popular sentiments, this article demonstrates the 
importance of incorporating historical material that can problematise the present whilst also enhancing 
our understanding of the past. Whereas historians have to date largely approached the environmental 
history of Mongolia in terms of a long-standing heritage of environmental protection (Boldbaatar 2002, 
Gagengaowa and Wuyunbatu 2003, Wu Feng and Bao Qingde 2009), this article questions the 
monolithic construction of a national environmentalism. Recognizing the hopes and fears that have 
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surrounded the extractive industry, we show how gold mining is not only a pressing issue today but has 
been a highly contentious issue in the politics of society and identity in Mongolia for centuries. 
 
The lure of gold 
The gold deposits in the Mongolian region have more than once given rise to speculation and 
investment. Gold fever first gripped the world’s imagination in 1848 with the discovery of numerous 
large deposits in California. Gold rushes then ensued in Australia from 1853, British Columbia from 
1858, Siberia from the 1860s, South Africa from 1886, and Canada from 1896. As these classic gold 
rushes spread across the world, the largely unchartered territory of Inner Asia presented international 
investors, entrepreneurs and adventurers with new and exciting prospects for further gold discoveries. 
The harsh weather and the arid land offered a promise of prosperity for those who dared to make the 
journey (Preobrazhensky 1993a, 1993b). 
 
The age of prospecting also saw an unprecedented number of explorers, missionaries and diplomats 
venturing through the region. Fascinated by the quotidian as well as the extraordinary, these travellers 
amassed a wealth of novel material for their writings. Given the period of their travels, it is perhaps 
little wonder that they paid particular attention to the role of gold in local life. However, the fantastic 
stories coming from the Inner Asian lands, often describing curious laws and taboos surrounding gold, 
received a mixed welcome. Many of the travellers were accused of embellishing their observations, 
authoring accounts that had little to do with scientific investigations and the advancement of 
comparative knowledge (Howorth et al. 1894, Review 1925, Thevenet 1989:265). Although the authors 
emerged largely victorious from the formal hearings held at the time
4
, the stories from Inner Asia still 
remain strikingly marginal to regional scholarship (cf. Bawden 1985). This paucity is all the more 
surprising given the accounts’ detailed insights into local ways of life, which more conventional 
historical material often leaves in silence. By focussing on some of these travellers’ accounts, this 
article seeks to convey the kinds of narratives that emerged from the region and begin our exploration 
into the historical position of gold mining in Mongolia. 
 
In 1841, the Lazarist missionaries Évariste-Régis Huc and Joseph Gabet were sent to explore a newly 
created apostolic vicariate on the Ordos plateau in today’s Inner Mongolia5. They spent two years 
wandering through regions that were rich in precious metals such as gold and silver. One evening, 
when they made camp in a desolate region haunted by the presence of robbers and vagabonds, a story 
came to their minds. In the “kingdom of Ouniot”, not far from where they camped, there was once a 
Chinese prospector who discovered a major gold vein
6
. Despite a “rigorous prohibition to work these 
mines” (Huc 1852:20), word of the abundant riches was quickly passed on and the area soon became 
home to thousands of fortune hunters. Whilst some of them worked in the mines, others pillaged 
surrounding areas. In the face of local people’s protests, lawlessness reigned. This state of disorder 
culminated when the Queen of Ouniot had to pass through the “valley of gold”, where she was held up 
and ordered to hand over her jewels. 
 
Upon her return home she reproached the King bitterly for his cowardice. At length, stung by her words, 
he assembled the troops of his two banners and marched against the miners. The engagement which 
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ensued was for a while doubtful, but at length the miners were driven in by the Tartar cavalry, who 
massacred them without mercy. The bulk of the survivors took refuge in the mine. The Mongols blocked 
up the apertures with huge stones. The cries of the despairing wretches within were heard for days and 
then ceased forever. Those of the miners who were taken alive had their eyes put out and were dismissed 
(ibid.:22-23). 
 
This story describes in detail the punishment of miners, highlighting the interest and power of ruling 
families and their role in maintaining order. Formal and explicit prohibitions against mining not only 
existed, but were also cruelly enforced. Since fortune hunters, El Dorados, and quasi-mythical gold 
nuggets pervaded popular European imagination at the time, the prohibition against mining in such a 
sparsely populated and remote region perplexed the missionaries. Their detailed attention to the 
punishment of miners might have been further triggered by the possibility that the prohibitions could 
indicate local moral frameworks. Such insights were central to the work on the missions, especially the 
Lazarist vicariate that was founded only one year earlier and was under the order of the resident Bishop 
Mouly to gather information about the customs and beliefs of the people to be evangelized. Their 
accounts thus give careful attention to such transgressions, often noting the location of the mining, the 
origin of the miners and their received punishment. Interestingly, the miners are consistently described 
as non-locals. Given the harsh punishment, these migrant-miners were potentially unaware of local 
legal frameworks or proceeded undeterred by the risks of punishment. Indeed, such risks might not 
have appeared that great since, as demonstrated in this story, political authorities did not necessarily 
take immediate measures to close down the prohibited mines.  
 
In some of the accounts, the miners searching for gold in the Mongolian region are specifically 
described as foreigners coming from other countries (e.g. Ossendowski and Stanton Palen 1924). In an 
account by a young Danish medical doctor Carl Krebs
7
, an old Buryat bear hunter entertained his 
foreign visitor with a story about how a Russian superintendent and his two Chinese labourers were 
murdered when mining for gold at a place where “evil spirits reign” (Krebs 1937:73)8. 
 
Two young Buryats who often enjoyed a cup of tea with Jakob [the Russian superintendent] offered him a 
wild boar that they had just shot. It was lying a bit up the mountainside in the forest. When they had 
walked far enough away so that the shot could not be heard from the hut, they shot Jakob. Afterwards, 
they walked back down and shot the Chinese [assistant] who was washing gold by the river. Only the girl 
was left then. Instead of wasting cartridges on her, they stabbed her to death (Krebs 1937:73-74)
9
. 
 
Like Huc and Gabet, Krebs was struck by the violent punishment of the miners (see also Ossendowski 
1923). Rather than ignoring the miners’ search for gold or awaiting the authorities’ arrival, the local 
population appeared to take instant action and put a forceful end to the mining operations. The painful 
cries, the stabbing to death and the pulled-out eyes emphasized to Krebs the perceived gravity and 
severity of the foreigners’ gold mining activities. Whilst such brutal confrontations between local 
populations and incoming miners might indicate a race to stake mining claims akin to gold rushes 
elsewhere, claims made by local prospectors are noticeably absent in the accounts. Indeed, quotidian 
mining carried out by locals appears strikingly nonexistent (see Prejevalsky 1876:58). Although this 
may be due to the genre of the accounts where violent confrontations might have made for more 
interesting and compelling reading, similar accounts from the same time period on neighbouring 
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regions do contain elaborate details of mining carried out by locals (cf. Rockhill 1891:178, 208, 209, 
Weale 1904:ch. 9, Michie 1864:283-289, Littlepage and Demaree 1938)
10
. Rather than regarding this 
paucity as a mere product of the literary genre, we suggest that the accounts point to a Mongolian 
reluctance to engage in mining as well as an identification of mining with foreign encroachment
11
. 
 
According to the Scottish missionary James Gilmour (1883), every time he dug a few stones of interest 
out of the ground, people became immediately suspicious and hostile towards him. He soon realized 
that they feared that he was searching for gold like so many other foreigners. If gold was mined, it 
would “take away the luck of the land” (ibid.:190). Living on “enchanted land”, people regarded such 
actions as “a curse to the land and the people” (ibid.:255). This hostility not only concerned the act of 
mining, but also applied to other activities that involved digging into the ground, especially if carried 
out by outsiders. The British diplomat Charles W. Campbell notes in a memoir from 1903 that the 
Mongols were fearful of the noblemen’s stone palaces and the foreigners’ new houses that were 
cropping up in Ih Hüree (present-day Ulaanbaatar). The sturdy walls that rose tall and the deep 
foundations that sat permanently into the land lent the buildings an ominous presence. “Mongols 
believe that all these old palaces and cities are haunted, and that the spirits are prone to bring 
misfortune on intruders” (Campbell 1903:494). 
 
Rather than relating to the land in terms of individual claims that justify the private ownership and use 
of the land, Mongols regarded the ‘enchanted land’ as an animate entity with fundamental implications 
for all aspects of human life. Failing to interact respectfully, curses were unleashed and misfortune was 
imminent. At a time when gold rushes spread across the world and the lure of gold attracted many a 
foreigner to the relatively unexplored region, mining operations were repeatedly brought to an end. 
Such closures convey not only an aversion towards mining, but also the ability of local populations to 
assert their own interests in the face of conflict. Although the miners were predominantly foreigners 
and their punishment often harsh, the travellers’ accounts from the 19th century do not generally portray 
the Mongols as violent or in any way xenophobic. Instead, they point specifically to mining as a 
contentious and pressing issue for local populations – much like it is today. 
 
 
The politics of a ‘pure’ land 
Whilst the travellers’ accounts mostly describe the ways in which local populations tackled the issue of 
gold mining, archival sources offer insights into the imperial State’s perspective. Specifically, this 
section will focus on the views and interests expressed by the men who ran the Qing government in 
Mongolia at the time. Although many of these documents are written in Manchu and some in Chinese, 
most of the writers used Mongolian for state affairs. This allows a certain Mongol voice to come 
through, if only that of elites. 
 
In contrast to the centralized nation-states that emerged in its wake, the territorially and 
demographically immense Qing Empire had a relatively small governing apparatus. With a Governor-
General based in Uliastai and two imperial representatives (called ambans) in Ih Hüree (modern-day 
Ulaanbaatar), the presence in Mongolia of court-appointed officials was minimal. These officials kept 
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in regular contact with the Board for Governing Outer Dependencies, which was an overseeing 
bureaucratic organ in Beijing
12
. Rather than seeking centralized control, the Qing court relied heavily 
upon and aligned its interests with the Mongol noblemen (called jasas). This alliance between court 
and Mongol aristocracy was regularly affirmed through visits to the emperor in Beijing, collective 
hunting expeditions, and exchanges of gifts. During the many wars of imperial expansion, the court 
also rewarded those Mongol elites who were loyal to the Qing whilst punishing those who resisted with 
military action
13
. Most Mongol political communities, including the Halh, were given stature and 
power within the empire; others, including Cahars and Oirats, were not. 
 
The court allocated its greatest endowments of wealth, prestige and authority to the jasas who were 
granted control over ‘banners’. Banners were a Qing innovation, constituting a fundamental unit of the 
imperial military and a core jurisdiction for civil life. Within the banner, a jasa had his own 
administration of clerks, police, guards, and other officials. Commoners paid taxes to and served corvée 
(their labour obligation) in the banner and if they committed a crime, they were tried at the jasa’s 
court
14
. As a result of the banner system, Qing rule over Mongolia was less of a conquest of one nation 
over another than a set of regulated, hierarchical and personal relationships between the emperor and 
the Mongol noblemen
15
. 
 
Whilst the imperial project attempted to incorporate individual Mongol elites into the state, it was also 
concerned with the protection of the “Mongol lands”. The court considered Mongol lands vital to the 
flourishing of the empire, not least because it formed a critical line of defence against the powerful 
Dzungar (1678-1756) and Russian empires. Defending Mongol lands entailed the protection of the 
territorial boundaries of the banners as well as the so-called Mongol “way of life” (Ma: banjire doro). 
This “way of life” was seen to make the local populations distinct and had economic, environmental, 
genealogical, cultural and political dimensions. In the mid-19
th
 century, aspects of a Mongol “way of 
life” specifically included the pursuit of steppe pastoralism, respect for the Dge-lugs-pa-school of 
Buddhism, and subjugation to banner and imperial authorities
16
. In order to ensure this protection, the 
Qing emperors sought to rule their Mongol constituency in an acceptably Mongol fashion, as khan and 
patron of Buddhism
17
. 
 
Ideally, the Mongols and Mongol lands were to be untainted by foreign influences. Noblemen were 
forbidden from giving their children Chinese names
18
 and Chinese men were prohibited from taking 
Mongol wives
19
. In Halh Mongolia, non-Mongols lived in quarters that were gated off from the 
community around them: the Manchus lived in walled garrisons and the Chinese in “trade towns” 
(maimaicheng) governed by separate laws and administrative systems.  Unless a permit was issued, no 
outsider could trespass banner land
20. All who were found to have ‘escaped’ across a border were 
detained by banner authorities, interrogated and removed under escort to their home jurisdiction for 
further punishment. The number and diversity of such ‘escapees’ testify to the limitations of the 
imperial project. While Chinese migrants were arrested most often, the archives record the arrests of a 
striking range of fugitives: Russians, Bukharans, Tibetans and even Ottoman Turks – a reflection of a 
certain cosmopolitanism to Qing Mongolia
21
. Interestingly, the occupations of those who illegally 
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entered Mongol lands included not just merchants, monks, mushroom pickers, farmers and slaves, but 
also miners. 
  
Local officials justified these policing efforts in terms of an imperial responsibility to “purify the land” 
(Mo: ajar i ariun bol-a, Ma: babe bolgo obu)22. ‘Pure’ lands most often referred to lands free of 
illegal Chinese migrants: if Chinese were found to be ‘mixing’ with the local population or engaging in 
disruptive activities, the use of state intervention and, if necessary, force was deemed appropriate. Such 
disruptive activities included actions that rendered the land unfit for the proper Mongol way of life, for 
example over-logging, over-fishing, over-hunting or mining. If the perpetrators were caught, the area 
subsequently required purification. This entailed the arrest of the perpetrators, the establishment of 
guard posts (karun) and intensified policing of the threatened grounds. In every case, achieving ‘purity’ 
was considered ‘of the utmost importance’. Mongol lands were thus a potentially fragile realm within 
which a prosperous and proper Mongol life could be pursued
23
. 
 
While the Qing court positioned itself as the protector of the Mongols and their lands, it also made 
material claims to gold. In the early Qing conquests of the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 centuries, gold was 
confiscated from defeated enemies and redistributed to loyal allies. Weapons and saddles inlaid with 
gold, gold coins, hairpins, necklaces, earrings, hatpins, buttons, and earrings flowed from the emperor 
to his clients
24
. In the late 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, a more peaceful form of ‘gold diplomacy’ helped 
reaffirm the relationship between emperor and subject. Gifts were exchanged, such as a golden lettered 
sutra from the Jebdzundamba Hutuktu to the Jiaqing Emperor in 1820 on his 60
th
 birthday, and, after 
his death, a golden leafed, trilingual order of imperial recognition was sent by the young Daoguang 
Emperor to the Jebdzundmba less than a year later
25
. Qing rulers also used gold ideologically to claim 
succession from the Chinggisids, the “Golden Khans” of the past. Gold was closely associated with 
ruling charisma in the Inner Asian ruling tradition and in classical Mongol texts, as Henry Serruys 
argued, “gold” symbolized “imperial” (Serruys 1962: 357). Chinggis Khan’s lineage was known as the 
“golden family” (altan uru), his government likened to a “golden yoke” (altan boola metü)26. Qing 
rulers, for their part, took their own “golden” family name (the “Golden” (Aisin) Gioro) and originally 
named their domain the “Golden State” (aisin gurun), before changing the name to Qing in 163627. In 
Qing period chronicles written in Mongolian, ‘gold’ continued to have these associations with 
legitimate rule and the Chinggisids, with the “Golden” Gioro identified as part of the ‘golden family’.  
Likewise, the Forbidden City took the name of the “Golden Palace” (Serruys 1962:359, 362)28, while 
the court conferred authority to the jasa with golden seals (Mostaert 1935-1936:318)29. 
 
The court made claims over regional products, such as horses, wild boars, and sables, all of which were 
exacted as tribute (alban) from various constituencies within Mongolia. Yet gold was treated 
differently. On the ground, Mongolian places known to contain gold were designated “restricted areas” 
(caγajilaγsan γajar), a term reserved for territory of unique imperial importance, such as the imperial 
hunting grounds and the lands rich with sable on the border with Russia
30
. However, whereas restricted 
hunting grounds were designed, in part, to ensure a plentiful catch for state-organized hunts, restricted 
gold fields were never meant to be productive. When trespassing or mining occurred, policing was 
stepped up. In one such case, in 1830, the Governor-General of Uliastai reported that “impoverished, 
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unemployed Chinese are crossing the border digging for gold sand”31. He requested two additional 
guard posts, each consisting of one captain and nine soldiers, to be established in the threatened area 
south of Uliastai. Thereafter, a total of 24 guard posts strung between Uliastai and Zuunmod were 
subject to special patrols, including annual inspections of their arsenals. If all remained secure, the 
guards had to vouch that “the mountain valleys which produce gold [saw] no illicit gold-digging and no 
sign of human activity”32. 
 
While Chinese migrants were a problem, they were not necessarily the primary concern of the court. 
Indeed, the court was much more concerned with the conduct of the Mongols. This emphasis is vividly 
expressed in a publication from 1841, which is the first set of laws to specifically address gold mining 
in Mongolia in the Laws of the Board Governing Outer Dependencies, the normative touchstone for 
legal practice in Mongolia
33
. Replacing an earlier edition from 1826, which was silent on the issue of 
gold mining, the 1841 Laws of the Board conveys many of the anxieties of the intervening 15 years. 
Drought and disastrous weather (zud) was recorded for the years 1826-1827, 1835-1837, and 1840, and 
the impact on the pastoral economy was severe
34
. Under duress, it appears that many Mongols turned to 
a range of illicit activities, including gold mining
35
. 
 
According to the revised Laws of the Board, banner authorities had responsibility for enforcing the 
prohibition on gold mining. If Chinese migrants broke the prohibition, the responsible official received 
a light fine (equal to one “ninth” of livestock), while the overseeing jasa lost three months pay. If, on 
the other hand, Mongols themselves had been mining gold, the punishment was twice as severe: the 
official was fired and the jasa lost six months pay. Worse still, if Mongols and Chinese had conspired 
to mine together, the official would not only be fired, but whipped 100 times, while the jasa was fined 
a full year’s pay. Most serious of all was the wilful collusion between Mongols, Chinese and banner 
officials. In this final case, the official was not only fired and whipped, but forced to wear the cangue
36
 
for a month, while the jasa was fined two years’ pay37. The greater the violation of the proper Mongol 
‘way of life’, the greater the punishment: Mongols mining for gold represented a greater transgression 
than Chinese who performed the same act, while Mongols who collaborated with Chinese were worse 
still. The identity of the miner was thus more significant than the act of mining in itself, the criminal 
more important than the crime. 
 
In cases where Chinese were known to have broken the prohibition, officials were thus required to 
investigate and report on whether local Mongols were collaborating. In cases involving large numbers 
of migrants, the nobility’s loyalty came into question. In 1782, Cebdenjab (an amban at Ih Hüree) 
reported that over 500 Chinese migrants were engaged in illegal gold mining within his jurisdiction. 
The Qianlong emperor (r.1735-1795) was exasperated and in his stern, personal reply he wondered 
openly if a Mongol was to blame: “The Halh live far from the interior. If Mongols are not seeking 
profit and soliciting [Chinese miners], how could the Chinese even know which places have gold and 
[where] to dig?”38 
 
As the edicts suggest, mining in Mongolia was taking place at a significant level from at least the 18
th
 
century on. Compared with today, its scope and intensity remained relatively limited. Yet the political 
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challenge it posed was clear to all. News of uncontrollable foreigners, violence, and atrocities 
surrounding mining circulated through all levels of society, from the local people who related terrifying 
stories to European travellers, to jasas, ambans, and the emperor himself, who responded with a newly 
elaborated prohibition. The call for ‘purity’ was also a response to these pressures. The aspirations 
embodied by the concept– clear boundaries between Mongols and Chinese, proper use of the land, and 
seamless functioning of the banner system – were inextricable from the sense of looming crisis.  
Boundaries were being blurred, the land was being scarred, and the banner system was failing to 
address the economic and political challenges of the 19
th
 century. 
The attraction of large-scale mining 
When mining was ultimately legalized, it was largely because Mongolia’s strategic place in the empire 
had changed. In the late 19
th
 century, the Qing state was decimated by violent rebellions, fiscal crises, 
and aggression from imperialist powers. Following European, Russian, and North American models, a 
new generation of officials increasingly promoted industrial mining as indispensable to reconstruction 
and in 1889 the Qing government established its first state-run gold mine at Mohe, in northern 
Manchuria. The prohibition on gold mining in Mongolia ended just a decade later, in 1899, with the 
ceding of mineral rights to the Mongolor mining company. Yet the dramatic policy changes of the early 
20
th
 century, on the eve of the empire’s collapse, represented in many ways a culmination of a 
liberalization of mining policy that began almost two centuries prior, when Qing commercial and 
military strength was at its apex. 
 
The early emperors had been generally opposed to opening mines anywhere in the empire, not just in 
Mongolia. If a county magistrate in the Chinese interior relayed upwards a request to open a new mine, 
potential profits were weighed unfavourably against social risks and the court invariably rejected the 
petition. For one, the local poor rarely seemed to benefit from mining. Instead, new mines only 
attracted migrant workers – young, unmarried men, without family or farm, who were prone to 
rabblerousing, licentiousness, and violence (Kuhn 1990, Sommer 2000). In China, these social 
concerns were matched by an equal desire to protect gravesites from disruptive digging and preserve 
the geomantic qualities of the environment – in Chinese, its fengshui39. 
 
However, from the mid-18
th
 century some of the empire’s most eminent statesmen began to argue that 
mining policy had grown out of touch with the demographic and economic reality on the ground, 
particularly in China’s agricultural core. The population of the empire tripled in the years 1700-1850 
alone (Lee 1982:743). Migrant workers seemed to be arriving in towns and villages like never before 
(Kuhn 2008:12-25). At the same time, demand for natural resources and precious metals was booming 
and opportunities to illegally mine abounded. With illegal mining running riot and eminent statesmen 
calling for reform, the court gradually began liberalizing mining policy. If merchants provided start-up 
capital and local authorities assured law and order, the court would be willing to endorse the effort
40
. 
 
In a few special cases, the court even allowed limiting mining ventures in Mongolia.  Gold mining was 
briefly legalized, for example, in Alashan, an Inner Mongolian banner bordering the Chinese interior. 
The ruling prince of Alashan, Lobsangdorji. spearheaded the effort. In the winter of 1756-1757, he first 
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reported that illegal Chinese migrants were digging for gold in the pasturelands of local Mongol 
herders. When banner forces attempted to drive the miners out, they resisted with hoes and axes
41
. 16 
years later, in the winter of 1772-1773, illicit mining was still an issue and Lobsangdorji felt obliged to 
raise the matter with the emperor himself while on a court visit to Beijing
42
. After an investigation by 
the Grand Council, troops were dispatched and more than 100 miners were captured and arrested. 
However, Prince Lobsangdorji was more interested in controlling the miners than driving them out
43
. In 
1774 he proposed a plan to organize the miners himself, with the men divided into work units of ten 
and each unit compensated with double the weight in silver for all gold produced
44
. Shortly after, the 
plan was approved and mining was legalized at the site. Chinese merchant houses quickly raised capital 
for the operation and a Chinese administrator was charged with immediate oversight of the miners
45
. 
For the privilege of using his land, Lobsangdorji would be compensated with one-third of the generated 
revenue. Upon its opening, the operation quickly boomed with an estimated 2000 miners producing 
352 silver taels
46
 worth of gold. Just three years later in 1777, however, the gold deposits were 
effectively depleted and the miners produced a mere nine taels worth of gold – a staggering bust47. 
Capital investment dried up and mining at the site was again prohibited
48
. 
 
A similar arrangement was set up more than 100 years later when Mongolia’s first industrial mines, 
under the direction of the new mining company Mongolor, were finally permitted to open. Mongolor 
was distinctive, in part, for being a Western-style joint-stock company. Instead of merchants from north 
China, start-up capital was offered by Victor van Grot, who was an ambitious Russian officer in the 
customs house at Tianjin, in exchange for open access to Outer Mongolia. 
 
The Mongolor proposal triggered a high-level debate at court, involving the emperor, top bureaucrats in 
Beijing, and the amban in Ih Hüree, with the amban responsible for assuring consent from the Mongol 
nobility (Ch: wanggong) to any contract with van Grot
49
. The welfare of Mongols was discussed, with 
those in favour of the proposal arguing that industrial mining would put Mongolia’s resources to use 
and alleviate widespread poverty
50
. The topmost concern, though, was the security threat posed by 
Mongolor’s foreign backing. To those opposed to the plan, any foreign presence in Mongolia was 
unacceptable. They argued, for example, that the completion of the China Eastern Railway, the far-
eastern leg of the Trans-Siberian railroad that traversed Qing Manchuria, had given Russia dangerous 
leverage in the northeast
51
. Those in favour dismissed such concerns by pointing to the successful 
operation of foreign-financed railways in northern China, asking defiantly “why only in [the 
jurisdiction of] Ih Hüree there are obstructions” to such successful modernization schemes52. Was 
Mongolia like Manchuria, a vulnerable frontier, or more like China itself, without need for any special 
treatment? 
 
The formal approval of the plan and the start of mining operations in 1899 suggest the answer at court. 
Mining machinery was sent at great expense from Europe and the contracting of workers began. Since 
the mining contract explicitly stated that Russians were to be excluded from the labour force in favour 
of Chinese and (it was hoped) destitute Mongols, Mongolor sought to hire locally. But it turned out to 
be a challenge. According to Frans Larson
53
, who worked with van Grot between 1900 and 1902, the 
Mongols refused to work in the mines (see also Montagu 1956)
54
. 
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There was plenty of gold in the locality. The Mongols looked on interestedly at the work, but did not 
cooperate in it. Digging great quantities of gold out of the earth did not appeal to the Mongol as a 
profitable way in which to spend his days. Labourers had to be imported. We got some Russians, but most 
of our workers were Chinese coolies who came from Shantung (Larson 1930:245-246). 
Due to the high political tensions between the Qing and Russian governments, the arrival of Russian 
migrants to the Mongolor mines strained the political goodwill for the mining venture that was meant 
to bring some much needed capital for the state budget
55
. Also, the local population demanded the 
mines to be closed and the political rulers began to fear that they were “losing the Mongols’ hearts”  56. 
In order to keep migrants out of the area, they therefore reinstituted the prohibition against outsiders 
mining in Tusiyetu and Cecen Han aimags
57
. However, given mounting concerns it was finally decided 
that the mines should close and they were not reopened until 1908 when a restructured agreement with 
higher percentages allotted to the Qing government and the Mongol noblemen was agreed. A spate of 
mining camps were officially established at Zhuerhupo in 1906, Gudala in 1908, Gugongtai in 1909, 
Halagenang in 1910, Kuiteng in 1911 and Yarbink in 1911 (Kadokura 1936:391). The boom climaxed 
in 1911, the year of Mongolia’s independence from the Qing Empire, but sharply declined shortly after. 
According to Russian archival sources, van Grot was ruined by debt and ultimately forced to flee to 
America “without a penny to his name (..) as a common labourer” (Romanov 1952 [1928]:510). The 
many years of local protests and renewed negotiation had drained the investors’ finances. Telegrams 
were sent abroad, alerting international banks and financiers of the fiasco. The enthusiastic reports that 
prospectors had sent home were eclipsed by cautionary tales of van Grot’s trials with the Mongols and 
his complete bankruptcy. 
 
The lure of gold that had repeatedly taken miners to the Inner Asian lands was once again stifled by the 
local population’s ability to contribute to the actual closures of mining operations. However, in contrast 
to the scenarios described in the travellers’ accounts, local populations were now protesting again 
mining carried out at an industrial-scale. Moreover, the new mining operations enjoyed the full 
endorsement of the court officials who had eyed a profitable new path for the generation of much-
needed state revenue. And, as hinted at in the archival material, this endorsement was likely to be 
shared by at least some of the local population. By considering both the travellers’ accounts and the 
archival material, it becomes clear that the politics of gold mining were not simply a black and white 
scenario with the court and the Mongol people consistently positioned in opposition. The politics of 
gold mining for the Qing court centred around the challenge of conciliating modern mining with the 
continued relevance among people for a certain Mongol ‘way of life’. Even if the ‘pure’ land was no 
longer an imperial category for environmental preservation and land control, it remained an important 
category to large parts of the population. Positioned centrally between increasingly diverging interests, 
the purity and exclusivity of the ‘enchanted land’ was a concern that, for many Mongols, extended far 
beyond the political and economic aspirations of the Qing court. 
 
Conclusion 
In April 2006 several hundred protestors took to the streets of Ulaanbaatar to protest against alleged 
government corruption and the mishandling of mineral wealth in Mongolia. Effigies of the country’s 
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then President, the Speaker of Parliament as well as mining-tycoon Robert Friedland were set on fire, 
whilst protestors held an extended hunger strike in the city’s central square. The protestors demanded 
that the government change its terms of negotiation with the company Ivanhoe Mines and insisted on 
terms more favourable to the country’s population. The demonstrators wanted Mongolia to retain a 
majority ownership of the mineral deposit, which was owned by a company that brought with it an 
extensive portfolio of environmental disasters and a generous concern for its shareholders
58
. Alongside 
protests against formal sector mining, civil movements also deplored the environmental and social 
consequences of the still growing gold rush. The gold fever had arrived in Mongolia and demonstrators 
were furious at the lure of gold that spread to both companies and individual miners. Prospecting and 
protesting was not only a theme of the Qing period, but also in Mongolia today. 
 
The protests documented in archival material and the accounts of travellers reflect a recurrent concern 
with the ‘purity’ of the landscape. Missionaries who take stones from the ground are met with hostility, 
while foreigners who dig for gold are punished brutally. Qing emperors prohibit practices of gold 
mining and sternly enforce the laws if disregarded. The land is to be kept ‘ariun’, protected from 
disturbing foreign presences. Mongolian protestors who today take to the streets of Ulaanbaatar raise 
concerns about the resilience of a fragile landscape. In response to companies re-directing rivers and 
gold rush miners converting the steppe into moon-like craters, they question whether the land will be 
able to continue sustaining its inhabitants. Concerns about the relationship between people and places 
have a long history. The idea that the land requires human care and protection is not new to Mongolia 
nor is it merely an instrumental response to current realities. In this article we hope to have shown that 
‘baigal’ is not only a powerful political currency of the present, but a long-standing reality for the 
Mongols. 
 
Emperors, governors and other political rulers have been central to both the protection of Mongol lands 
and the acquisition of its mineral wealth. Yet, repeated attempts at regulation and policing have not 
managed to curb the spellbinding attraction of gold. Spurred on by broader economic, demographic and 
social processes, Chinese migrants ventured to Qing Mongolia in search of this precious metal. 
Mongolian noblemen used their position of political autonomy to set up independent mines, 
disregarding the emperors’ prohibitions. The current politics of gold mining in Mongolia evokes 
similar historical dynamics between rulers and rascals. Even today, thousands of people are mining for 
gold outside the purview of State law – except this time the rascals are Mongols themselves. Qing 
regulations held Mongols to a higher standard of conduct than Chinese. When Mongols defied taboos 
on mining, the stakes were higher – and they were never higher than when gold was involved. Gold 
was historically a key constituent in the representation of political power. Enshrined in legal codes, 
gold was meant to flow upwards to the ruler, to sustain and display his position. As Mongolia’s first 
ever official gold rush is today debated by members of parliament, this verticality is being challenged. 
The current gold rush is producing gold that lies outside the reach of the Bank of Mongolia, outside the 
regulation of the Cadastre Office, and outside the official production tables of the country. Today’s 
gold rush is producing a kind of gold that truly is new. 
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The history of Mongolia shares much with other gold-rush nations of the 19
th
 century. Globally, the era 
was marked by an unprecedented degree of cross-border movement, displacement, and migration, 
unfolding amidst renewed efforts to harden boundaries and define nations. Indeed, the same pulse that 
first brought migrant miners to the Mongol lands brought the same men to contemporary gold rushes 
across the world, from California and Australia, to British Columbia, Siberia, and South Africa
59
. In 
each case, exclusion laws ultimately followed the rush to the gold fields. The drive for the 
“purification” of Mongolia was thus not wholly unique. However, with miners and exclusion laws 
arriving a full century in advance, Mongolia was ahead of the curve. The types of anxieties it 
confronted were what others around the world confronted at a later date. Yet, in contrast to the classic 
gold rush nations, the Mongolian politics of exclusion were not driven by anti-immigration acts against 
Chinese miners or concerted attempts to exclude migrant labourers from an emerging labour 
aristocracy. It was rather a complete rejection of mining specifically. In a world that is still turned 
literally upside down in the search for gold, Mongolia is again in the midst of a battle over its mining. 
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See MNCA M1D1.3822.48a.  For a registry listing a group of intermarried couples living in Ih Hüree in 1824, see MNCA 
M1D1.844. 
20
 For text of the laws, see “jecen de fafularangge” in KHB (34; 53.9a-10b). Restrictions on mobility went both ways, as the 
laws also specified that Mongols could not privately cross the border into the Chinese interior. 
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Ming emperors, who were given the title by some allied Mongols as a sign of high respect. Thomas Allsen argues that the gold-
as-imperial tradition was distinctly “nomadic”, with the Jin and Qing emperors excluded from the tradition on grounds that “the 
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33
 The law also introduced regulations on silver mining. The punishment for mining gold and silver were identical.  
34
 Catalogue, MNCA M1D1 archives. 
35
 Other trades in natural resources, such as fur and elk antlers (used in Chinese medicine), also spiked during these years. 
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 Kuangwu dang, 4896. 
52
 Kuangwu dang, 4897. 
53
 Frans Larson first came to Mongolia in 1893 with the Christian Missionary Alliance of New York and worked under their 
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state equity participation, the Government can take a stake in new mines in order to maintain greater control over its mineral 
wealth and secure greater financial benefits. Currently, the government has identified 15 deposits as having strategic 
importance and has an unpublished list of another 39 that it may classify as strategic in the future (see High forthcoming). 
59
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